Abstract. This paper describes the state of the art for cryptographic hash functions. Different definitions are compared, and the few theoretical results on hash functions are discussed. A brief overview is presented of the most important constructions, and some open problems are presented.
Introduction
Hash functions are well known in computer science. They compress a string of arbitrary length to a string of fixed length and are used to allocate as uniformly as possible storage for the records of a file. For cryptographic applications, additional security requirements are necessary: informally, one requires that they are hard to invert, and (in most cases) that it is hard to find colliding inputs. This is achieved by creating a mapping that associates to an input string a 'randomly looking' output string (note that formally this makes no sense, as hash functions are deterministic mappings). As a consequence of these properties, hash functions create a 'unique' relationship between the input and the hash value; there are of course many inputs corresponding to a single output, but it is hard to identify these.
Cryptographic hash functions can be used to protect the integrity of large amounts of information (such as the content of a hard disk, a set of financial transactions, a software program) by the integrity of a short string, the hash result. This protection can be achieved by digitally signing this short string [31] , or by writing down the string on a piece of paper that is stored in a secure place. This is analogous to conventional message encryption, that replaces the secrecy of a large amount of information by the secrecy (and authenticity) of a secret key; typically this key is much shorter than the message.
Hash functions have been used (and sometimes abused) for many other cryptographic applications. Examples include -the protection of pass-phrases (where the image of the pass-phrase under the hash function is stored in the computer, rather than the pass-phrase itself); -the commitment to a string without revealing it (see Damgård et al. [27] ).
-the construction of Message Authentication Codes (MACs), by introducing in the hash function a second parameter that is kept secret [5, 7, 70] ; -key derivation, for example to derive session keys from a transaction number and a master key.
The last two applications assume that the hash function keyed by a second parameter yields a pseudo-random function, or a mapping that is hard to predict. Hash functions have also been used to instantiate 'random oracles' [9] ; this requires even stronger properties. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the definitions and Sect. 3 discusses generic constructions and security results. Specific constructions are treated in Sect. 4 , while conclusions and open problems are presented in Sect. 5.
Definitions
One distinguishes between hash functions that have only a single input, and hash functions that have a second input. The first type are sometimes called MDCs or Manipulation Detection Codes; many authors refer to this type simply as cryptographic hash functions, or even hash functions. If the second parameter is secret, one calls these functions keyed hash functions; an important subclass are MACs or Message Authentication Codes. Finally the second parameter can also be public; examples in this class are the UOWHFs or Universal One-Way Hash Functions.
Note that one should not confuse hash functions with checksums that are used for error detection or correction (such as the well known Cyclic Redundancy Checks or CRCs).
First we define one-way hash functions (OWHF) and collision resistant hash functions (CRHF). Both classes of hash functions are studied in this paper. Then we look at some related concepts, namely message authentication codes (MACs), universal one-way hash functions (UOWHFs) and universal hash functions.
In the following the hash function will be denoted with h, and its argument, i.e., the information to be protected with x. The image of x under the hash function h will be denoted with h(x). It will be assumed that the description of the hash function h is publicly known, and that it does not require any secret information (except for the optional parameter, which may be secret). A second assumption is that given the inputs, the computation of the hash result must be "easy."
One-Way Hash Function (OWHF)
The concept of one-way hash functions was introduced by Diffie and Hellman in [31] . The first informal definition was apparently given by Merkle [59, 60] and Rabin [73] . A one-way hash function is a function h satisfying the following conditions:
1. The argument x can be of arbitrary length and the result h(x) has a fixed length of n bits (with n ≥ 64 . . . 80). 2. The hash function must be one-way in the sense that given a y in the image of h, it is "hard" to find a message x such that h(x) = y (preimage resistant) and given x in the domain of h and h(x) it is "hard" to find a message x = x such that h(x ) = h(x) (second preimage resistant).
Note that this last condition (finding a second preimage is "hard") differs from the intuitive concept of one-wayness, namely that it is "hard" to find a preimage x given only h and the value of h(x). It is clear that for permutations or injective functions only preimage resistance is relevant. The relation between preimage resistance and second preimage resistance is discussed in [58, 67] . The above definition is only informal. For example, one should specify the distribution that is used to select y respectively x, and specify what "hard" and "easy" means. The definition should also take into account that one can always invert functions with a small range (by exhaustive search) and that one can always precompute the function in a small set. There are many ways to formalize the definition, and it is a non-trivial exercise to show which of these are equivalent.
For a formal definition, we need to specify a model of computation. Rather than probabilistic Turing machines (that are used traditionally in cryptography), we will follow here Bellare and Rogaway [10] and use the RAM model including pointers (see for example [22] ); execution time is measured with respect to that model. An adversary is a program for this model, written in some fixed programming language. The adversary has access to random bits. 1 The running time includes the actual execution time and the length of the program description.
The set of all integers will be denoted with I N. The alphabet considered is the binary alphabet Σ = {0, 1}. For n ∈ I N, Σ n is the set of all binary strings of length n. The set of all strings of arbitrary length will be written as Σ * . The size of a set S is denoted with |S|. Let h be a function with domain D = Σ * and range R = Σ n . Note that in fact we will only consider inputs of bit length l(n), with l(n) a function that satisfies l(n) > n. This is not a real restriction, since it is not possible (in practice) to evaluate a function in inputs that are too large. Definition 1. A one-way hash function H is a function with domain D = Σ l(n) and range R = Σ n that satisfies the following conditions:
-preimage resistance: let x be selected uniformly in D and let M be an adversary that on input h(x) uses time ≤ t and outputs
Here the probability is also taken over the random choices of M .
1 Returning a random integer in the interval [1, n] takes time Θ(log n). -2nd preimage resistance: let x be selected uniformly in Σ l(n) and let M be an adversary that on input x uses time ≤ t and outputs x ∈ D with x = x. For each adversary M ,
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The above definition is only meaningful if t/ is large; it is clear that t/ ≤ 2 n . One can specify a constant as required by a given application.
Note that this model does not take into account precomputation, which can be used to speed the computation of many preimages (as for example in Hellman [49] ).
Collision Resistant Hash Function (CRHF)
The fact that a function is one-way does not mean that it is hard to find two colliding inputs; it will be shown in Sect. 3.2 that the effort to find a collision is only the square root of the effort to find a (2nd) preimage. This motivates the definition of a collision resistant function as a separate primitive. Note that some authors call this a collision free hash function [24] [25] [26] , or a collision intractible hash function [89] .
The first formal definition of a CRHF was given by Damgård [24, 25] . An informal definition was given by Merkle in [60] . A collision resistant hash function is a function h satisfying the following conditions:
1. The argument x can be of arbitrary length and the result h(x) has a fixed length of n bits (with n ≥ 128 . . . 160). 2. The hash function must be one-way, i.e., preimage resistance and second preimage resistant. 3. The hash function must be collision resistant: this means that it is "hard" to find two distinct messages that hash to the same result.
Finding a second preimage cannot be easier than finding a collision: therefore the second preimage condition in this definition is redundant. However, preimage resistance is not necessarily implied by collision resistance (note that it is required for certain applications). Damgård provides some definitions and conditions under which collision resistance implies preimage resistance [26] ; see also Gibson's comment in [42] . Formalizing a collision resistant hash function is not as straightforward as formalizing a one-way hash function. One cannot specify that there should not exist an adversary that outputs a collision: since there are many colliding inputs that are very short, there will be many efficient adversaries that can output a pair of inputs that collide under x (just include two such inputs in the code). The way out of this problem is to define collision resistance as the property of a family H of hash functions, that is, a set of functions indexed by a parameter S. For simplicity, it will be assumed that S is taken from the parameter space Σ s . Thus H is a mapping from D × Σ s → R, and an individual function in this family is denoted with h S : D → R. -the functions h S are preimage resistant and second preimage resistant (cf. Definition 1). -collision resistance: let F be a collision string finder that on input S ∈ Σ s uses time ≤ t and outputs either "?" or a pair x, x ∈ Σ l(n) with x = x such that h S (x ) = h S (x). For each F ,
Here the probability is also taken over the random choices of F .
Again this definition is only meaningful if t/ is large; it will follow from Sect. 3.2 that an upper bound is 2.24 · 2 n/2 .
Universal One-Way Hash Function
The concept of a UOWHF was introduced by Naor and Yung [64] . In [10] , Bellare and Rogaway give a concrete definition (rather than an asymptotic one) and study practical constructions for this primitive under the name 'target collision resistant hash functions.' Definition 3. A universal one-way hash function H is a function family with domain D = Σ l(n) and range R = Σ n , that satisfies the following condition:
-Let F = (F 1 , F 2 ) be an adversary. F 1 is run first; it is an algorithm that produces x and possibly some state information; this information is passed on to F 2 . Algorithm F 2 is given S, x and the state information and outputs either "?" or an x = x such that h S (x ) = h S (x).
For each F that runs in time ≤ t (that is, the sum of the running times of
The main difference with collision resistance is that here the input x is fixed first, and then the parameter S is chosen. This implies that finding collisions for a given value of S does not help an attacker.
Naor and Yung show that a UOWHF can be used to build a digital signature scheme [64] . Rompel [78] developed a (very inefficient) construction for a UOWHF based on any one-way function; in this way he reduces a digital signature scheme to a one-way function, which is the weakest possible assumption. A UOWHF can replace a CRHF in a digital signature scheme if the signer does not intend to repudiate her signatures (see also Sect. 3.2). 
Appeared in

Definition 4.
A MAC algorithm is a function h satisfying the following conditions:
1. The argument x can be of arbitrary length and the result h K (x) has a fixed length of n bits (with n ≥ 32 . . . 64). 2. Given h and x, it is "hard" to forge a MAC on a new message, that is, to determine h K (x) with a probability of success "significantly higher" than 1/2 n . Even when many pairs {x i , h K (x i )} are known, where the x i have been selected (sequentially) by the opponent, it is "hard" to compute h K (x ) for any x = x i .
The last attack is called an adaptive chosen text attack. One distinguishes between forgery attacks and key recovery attacks: a forgery allows to determine the MAC on a new message; a key recovery attack is much more serious as it allows to forge the MAC for an arbitrary message.
The exact security of a MAC algorithm can be expressed in terms of the running time t of the adversary, the number of known and (adaptively) chosen texts an adversary has access to, and the probability of success of the forgery attack (see e.g., [7] ).
A MAC algorithm can be used for message authentication between a sender and a receiver who share a secret key K. In order to protect a message, the sender applies the MAC algorithm to the message and appends the resulting string to the message. On receipt of the message, the receiver recomputes the MAC and verifies that it corresponds to the transmitted MAC value. An active eavesdropper Eve can modify the message, but as she does not know the secret key, she cannot predict the MAC value for the modified message.
Universal Hash Functions
Universal hash functions are combinatorial objects, which implies that they can be defined without using a model of computation. They were introduced by Carter and Wegman [15, 86] , who show that they can be applied to efficient unconditionally secure message authentication. In this way they found practical constructions for the authentication codes introduced by Simmons in the 1970s [80] . The first published reference to authentication codes is Gilbert et al. [44] . Other applications of universal hash functions include interactive proof systems, pseudo-random number generation, complexity theory, and probabilistic algorithms.
A universal hash function is a mapping from a finite set A with size a to a finite set B with size b. For a given hash function h and for a pair (x, x ) with 
As above, a finite set of hash functions will be denoted family H of hash functions. Now δ H (x, x ) is defined as h∈H δ h (x, x ), or δ H (x, x ) counts the number of functions in H for which x and x collide. If a random choice of h is made, then for any two distinct inputs x and x , the probability that these two inputs yield a collision equals δ H (x, x )/ |H|. For a universal hash function, the goal is to minimize this probability together with the size of H.
Definition 5. Let be any positive real number. An -almost universal family (or -AU family) H of hash functions from a set A to a set B is a family of functions from A to B such that for any distinct elements x, x ∈ A
This definition states that for any two distinct inputs the probability for a collision is at most . In [15] the case = 1/b is called universal (the smallest possible value for is (a − b)/b(a − 1)).
Definition 6. Let be any positive real number. An -almost strongly universal family (or -ASU family) H of hash functions from a set A to a set B is a family of functions from A to B such that -for every x ∈ A and for every y ∈ B, | {h ∈ H :
The first condition states that the probability that a given input x is mapped to a given output y equals 1/b. The second condition implies that if x 1 is mapped to y 1 , then the conditional probability that x 2 (different from x 1 ) is mapped to y 2 is upper bounded by . The lowest possible value for equals 1/b and this family has been called strongly universal functions in [86] . Stinson shows that for this family the first condition in the definition follows from the second one [83] . An -almost strongly universal hash function family can be used in a similar way as a MAC algorithm. The secret key K chooses a function in the family; unlike the key for a MAC algorithm, the key can serve to authenticate a single message only. An -almost universal hash function family can also provide message authentication, but in addition its result needs to be encrypted (for example using a one-time pad).
Generic Constructions and Attacks
First a general model is presented for iterated hash functions. Next generic attacks are described, that is, attacks that are independent of the specific details of the hash function. This section is concluded with a discussion of generic security results for hash functions. 
A General Model for Iterated Hash Functions
Most known hash functions are based on a compression function with fixed size inputs; they process every message block in a similar way. Lai and Massey call this an "iterated" hash function [55] . The information is divided into t blocks x 1 through x t . If the total number of bits is not a multiple of the block length, the information is padded to the required length (using a so-called padding rule).
The hash function can then be described as follows:
The result of the hash function is denoted with h(x) and IV is the abbreviation for Initial Value. The function f is called the round function or compression function, and the function g is called the output transformation. It is often omitted (that is, g is often the identity function). Two elements in this definition have an important influence on the security of a hash function: the choice of the padding rule and the choice of the IV . It is recommended that the padding rule is unambiguous (i.e., there do not exist two messages that can be padded to the same padded message); at the end one should append the length of the message; and the IV should be defined as part of the description of the hash function (this is called MD-strengthening after Merkle and Damgård). In some cases one can deviate from this rule, but this will make the hash function less secure and may lead to trivial collisions or second preimages. An alternative model is a tree structure, that allows for increased parallelism and may result in different security conditions for the round function (see also Sect. 3.3). For the time being it is rarely used in practice.
The general model for MAC algorithms is similar to that of MDCs; the use of an output transformation is more common here. Bellare and Rogaway [10] show that the above model does not work for a UOWHF, and they introduce a different approach. Earlier Naor and Yung developed a different iterated construction for a UOWHF in [64] .
Generic Attacks
This section gives an overview of the known general attacks methods on MDCs. A first class of attacks depend only on the size of the parameters, and not on the specific hash function. The second class depends on the properties of the round function f . This taxonomy can be helpful to understand the security results presented in Sect. 3.3, but can also serve as a caveat for designers and users of hash functions.
Attacks Independent of the Algorithm These attacks depend only on the size n in bits of the hash result, and are independent of the specific details of 64 operations is considered to be on the edge of feasibility. In view of the fact that the speed of computers is multiplied by four every three years (this is one of the formulations of Moore's law), 2 70 operations is sufficient for the next 5 to 10 years, but it will be only marginally secure within 15 years. For applications that require protection for 20 years, one should try to design the hash function such that an attack requires at least 2 80 operations.
Random (2nd) Preimage Attack. The opponent selects a random message and hopes that a given hash result will be hit. If the hash function has the required "random" behavior, his probability of success equals 1/2 n with n the number of bits of the hash result. This attack can be carried out off-line and in parallel, which means that n should be at least 64.
If a significant number of messages can be attacked simultaneously, it is advisable to select a larger value of n. In that case it is preferable to use a UOWHF rather than a simple OWHF: as every instance will have a different parameter, this prevents an attacker from amortizing his effort over many targets.
Birthday Attack. The birthday paradox states that for a group of 23 people, the probability that at least two people have a common birthday exceeds 1/2. Intuitively one expects that the probability is much lower. However, the number of pairs of people in such a group equals 23·22/2 = 253. This can be exploited to find collisions for a hash function as follows: an adversary generates r 1 variations on a bogus message and r 2 variations on a genuine message. The expected number of collisions equals r 1 · r 2 /n. The probability of finding a bogus message and a genuine message that hash to the same result is given by 1 − exp(−r 1 · r 2 /2 n ), which is about 63% when r = r 1 = r 2 = 2 n 2 . Finding the collision does not require r 2 operations: after sorting the data, which requires O(r log r) operations, comparison is easy. This attack was first pointed out by Yuval [87] .
One can reduce the memory requirements for collision search by translating the problem to the detection of a cycle in an iterated mapping. Indeed, any mapping that is iterated on a finite set will eventually repeat, i.e., it will enter a cycle. If the mapping is a random mapping (rather than a permutation), the entry point to the cycle corresponds to a collision for the function (this algorithm fails if the starting point belongs to the cycle, but this event has a negligible probability). The detection of a cycle does not require storing all the values; for example, the technique of distinguished points can be used (one only stores special points, for example those points beginning with 30 zero bits). Cycle detection techniques were first applied to collision search by Quisquater [71] . The expected number of function evaluations of his algorithm is 2 π/2 · 2 n 2 ; the storage requirements are negligible. In [85] , van Oorschot and Wiener propose an efficient parallel variant of this algorithm: the speed-up is linear with the number of processors. They estimate that with a 10 million US$ machine, collisions for MD5 (with n = 128) can be found in 21 days (in 1994). In order to make a collision search infeasible, n should be at least 160 bits. For digital signatures, hash functions need to be collision resistant since otherwise one can sign one message and later claim to have signed a different message, or be held accountable for a different message. There is no way to prevent a sender from performing this attack, although the occurrence of two messages that hash to the same value might make him suspect. Outsiders can perform the same attack if they can convince the signer to sign a message of their choice. The sender can protect himself through randomizing the message just prior to signing (or by randomizing the hash function as is done for a UOWHF, cf. Sect. 2.3).
Attacks Dependent on the Chaining
n ). The only restriction that applies to the meeting point is that it cannot be the first or last value of the chaining variable. The cycle finding algorithm has been extended by Quisquater to perform a meet-in-the-middle attack with negligible storage [72] . The attack can be precluded by avoiding functions f that are invertible to the chaining variable H i−1 and to the message x i (see also Theorem 1 in Sect. 3.3).
Further extensions of this attack have been proposed by Coppersmith [19] and Girault et al. [46] to break p-fold iterated schemes, i.e., weak schemes with more than one 'pass' over the message as proposed by Davies [28] . Other extensions take into account additional constraints on the message.
Fixed Point Attack. The idea of this attack is to look for an H i−1 and x i such that f (x i , H i−1 ) = H i−1 . If the chaining variable is equal to H i−1 , it is possible to insert an arbitrary number of blocks equal to x i without modifying the hash result. Producing collisions or a second preimage with this attack is only possible if the chaining variable can be made equal to H i−1 : this is the case if IV can be chosen equal to a specific value, or if a large number of fixed points can be constructed (e.g., if one can find an x i for a significant fraction of H i−1 's). Of course this attack can be extended to fixed points that occur after more than one iteration. This attack can be made more difficult by appending a block count and by fixing IV (MD-strengthening, see Sect. 3.1).
General Security Results
Research on hash functions has focussed on the question: which properties should be imposed on f to guarantee that h satisfies certain properties? Two partial answers have been found to this question. The first result by Lai and Massey [55] gives necessary and sufficient conditions for f in order to obtain an "ideally secure" hash function h, that is, a hash function for which finding a preimage takes time Θ(2 n ).
Theorem 1 (Lai-Massey). Assume that the padding contains the length of the input string, and that the message x (without padding) contains at least 2 blocks.
Then
Necessity of the condition is based on the following argument: if one can find a second preimage for f in 2 s operations (with s < n), one can find a second preimage for h in 2 (n+s)/2+1 operations with a meet-in-the-middle attack (cf.
Sect. 3.2).
A second result by Damgård [26] and independently by Merkle [60] states that for h to be a CRHF it is sufficient that f is a collision resistant function.
Theorem 2 (Damgård-Merkle).
Let f be a collision resistant function mapping l to n bits (with l − n > 1). If an unambiguous padding rule is used, the following construction yields a CRHF:
Here denotes the concatenation of binary strings. The construction can be improved slightly, 2 and extended to the case where l = n + 1, at the cost of an additional assumption on f (see [26] for details and Gibson's comment in [42] ). It can also be extended to a tree construction, which allows for increased parallelism [26] .
We conclude this section with two other general results on the theory of hash functions. Damgård has showed in [25] that a collision resistant hash function can be constructed if claw-free permutations exist; Russell has slightly weakened this requirement to the existence of claw-free pseudo-permutations [79] (pseudopermutations are functions that cannot be distinguished from permutations). Recently Simon [82] has provided a motivation to treat collision resistant hash functions as independent cryptographic primitives. He showed that no provable construction of a CRHF exists based on a "black box" one-way permutation, i.e., a one-way permutation treated as an oracle.
An Overview of Constructions
This section briefly discusses three types of MDCs: MDCs based on a block cipher, MDCs based on algebraic structures (modular arithmetic, knapsack, and lattice problems), and custom designed MDCs. For a more detailed discussion, the reader is referred to [67, 68] .
MDCs Based on a Block Cipher
Several arguments can be given for designers of hash functions to base their schemes on existing encryption algorithms. The first argument is purely historical: DES [37] was the first standard commercial cryptographic primitive that was widely available; it seemed natural to construct hash functions based on this block cipher. A second argument is the minimization of the design and implementation effort: hash functions and block ciphers that are both efficient and secure are hard to design, and many examples that support this view can be found in the literature. Moreover, existing software and hardware implementations can be reused, which will decrease the cost. The major advantage however is that the trust in existing encryption algorithms can be transferred to a hash function. The main disadvantage of this approach is that custom designed hash functions are likely to be more efficient. This is particularly true because hash functions based on block ciphers require a key change after every encryption. Finally note that block ciphers may exhibit some weaknesses that are only important if they are used in a hashing mode. One also has to take into account that in some countries export restrictions for block ciphers may be tighter than those for hash functions.
The encryption operation E will be written as y = E K (x). Here x denotes the plaintext, y the ciphertext, and K the key. The size of the plaintext and ciphertext or the block length (in bits) will be denoted with r, while the key size (in bits) will be denoted with k. In the case of the well known block cipher DES, r = 64 and k = 56 [37] . The hash rate of a hash function based on a block cipher is defined as the number of r-bit input blocks that can be processed with a single encryption.
A distinction will be made between the cases n = r, n = 2r, and n > 2r. This is motivated by the fact that most proposed block ciphers have a block length of only 64 bits, and hence an MDC with a result at least twice the block length is necessary to obtain a CRHF. Other proposals are based on a block cipher with a large key, or on a block cipher with a modified key schedule.
Size of Hash Result Equal to the Block Length. If follows from Sect. 3.2 that these hash functions can only be collision resistant if the block length r is at least 128 bits to 160 bits. Most present day block ciphers have only a block length of 64 bits, but the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), which NIST intends to publish by 2001, will have a block length of 128 bits.
All schemes of this type proposed in the literature have rate 1. The first 'secure' construction for such a hash function was the '85 scheme by Matyas et al. [57] :
Here s() is a mapping from the ciphertext space to the key space. This scheme has been included in ISO/IEC 10118-2 [51] , and it forms the main building block for other hash functions based on block ciphers. This general construction is also used in several custom designed hash functions (cf. Sect. 4.3). It is widely believed that this mapping is hard to invert, but there is no proof of this. It is not even clear which assumptions have to imposed on the block cipher to allow for such a proof. One can apply the following intuitive reasoning: either one chooses the plaintext x, but then one has to find the key corresponding to one plaintext/ciphertext pair, which is deemed to be infeasible; alternatively, one chooses the key, but then one has to find for a given key a plaintext/ciphertext pair with a known difference, which is also believed to be difficult. Therefore it is conjectured that if the block cipher is 'ideal' (i.e., a keyed random one-way permutation) no shortcut attacks exist, which implies that a collision attack requires Θ(2 r/2 ) operations and a (2nd) preimage attack Θ(2 r ) operations. Preneel et al. show that 12 variants exist with a similar security level; they can be obtained by applying an affine transformation to the inputs of two basic schemes [69] . Moreover, the security level of these hash functions is limited by min(k, r), even if the size of some internal variables is equal to max(k, r). One such variant is widely known as the Davies-Meyer scheme (the real inventors are probably Matyas and Meyer):
It has the advantage that it extends more easily to block ciphers where key size and block size are different.
Size of Hash Result Equal to Twice the Block Length. The goal of double block length hash functions is to achieve a higher security level against collision attacks. Ideally a collision attack on such a hash function should require 2 r operations, and a (2nd) preimage attack 2 2r operations. A series of proposals attempted to double the size of the hash result, for example by iterating a OWHF; all of these succumbed to a 'divide and conquer' attack. A large class of proposals of rate 1 has the following form:
where A showed that for all hash functions in this class, a preimage attack requires at most 2 r operations, and a collision attack requires at most 2 3r/4 operations (for most schemes this can be reduced to 2 r/2 ) [53] . The few proposals that survive till today have rate less than 1. Two important examples are MDC-2 and MDC-4 with hash rate 1/2 and 1/4 respectively. They have been designed by Bracht et al. [13] , and are also known as the MeyerSchilling hash functions after the authors of the first paper describing these schemes [63] . MDC-2 has been included in ISO/IEC 10118-2 [51] (in a more general form); it can be described as follows:
Here the variables H [67, 54] that collisions for the compression function of MDC-4 can be found with 2 3r/4 encryptions and the storage of 2 3r/4 r-bit quantities.
Merkle describes an interesting proposal in [60] , for which he proves that the compression function is collision resistant based on the assumption that the underlying single block length scheme is secure. The simplest scheme (with rate 1/18.3 for DES) can be described as follows:
Here H i−1 is a string consisting of 112 bits, the leftmost 55 bits of which are denoted H 1 i−1 , and the remaining 57 are denoted H 2 i−1 ; x i consists of 7 bits only. The function chop r drops the r rightmost bits of its argument. Note that this construction is similar to MDC-2 (but much slower). The most efficient proposal is more complex and use six invocations of the block cipher in two layers. Its hash rate is equal to 0.27 for DES. Merkle's proof for this proposal only showed a security level of 2 52.5 against collisions; Preneel has improved this to 2 56 [67] . Even the schemes in this class that provide optimal security do not offer long term collision resistance when used with DES; this will change with AES, which will have a block and key length of 128 bits (key lengths of 192 and 256 bits will also be provided).
Size of Hash Result Larger Than Twice the Block Length. Knudsen and Preneel also design a collision resistant compression function, but with parallel encryptions only [54] . They show how a class of efficient constructions for hash functions can be obtained by using non-binary error-correcting codes. Their schemes can achieve a provable security level against collisions equal to 2 r , 2 3r/2 (or more) and this with rates larger than 1/2; the security proof reduces the security of this scheme to an assumption on the single block length hash functions. The internal memory of the scheme is however much larger than 2 or 3 blocks, which implies that an output transformation is required.
Other constructions. Extending earlier work by Merkle [59] , Lai and Massey [55] propose constructions for block ciphers with a key twice as long as the block length (Tandem Davies-Meyer and Abreast Davies-Meyer). Both schemes have rate equal to 1/2; the best known attacks for a preimage and a collision requires 2 2r respectively 2 r encryptions. Faster schemes in this class have been developed in [54] .
Aiello and Venkatesan propose in [1] a construction to double the output of a random function. In order for it to be usable for hashing, one needs to define the key schedule of this larger 'block cipher'. The construction by Aiello, Haber, and Venkatesan [2] replaces the key schedule of DES by a function from the MDx-family (cf. Sect. 4.3); several instances are combined by choosing different (fixed) plaintexts.
MDCs Based on Algebraic Structures
First hash functions based on modular arithmetic are considered. Next hash functions based on knapsack problems and lattices are presented. This section is concluded with a short discussion of incremental hash functions.
MDCs Based on Modular Arithmetic. These hash functions are designed to use the modular arithmetic hardware that is required to produce digital signatures (for example, RSA [77] ). The security of certain constructions can be based on the hardness of some number theoretic problems. Moreover these schemes are easily scalable. The disadvantage is that the underlying primitive has a rich mathematical structure; this can be exploited in attacks that use the homomorphic structure and the fixed points of modular exponentiation (trivial examples are 0 and 1); one also has to ensure that no small inputs occur.
A distinction is made between 'ad hoc' schemes, which have no provable reduction to the underlying hard problem, and provably secure schemes. Schemes in the first class are typically much more efficient, but many proposals have been broken; however, it seems that recently designers have been more conservative and designs survive longer.
Schemes Without Security Reduction. Most of these schemes uses a modulus N , that is, the product of two large primes. The size of N in bits (denoted with n) is typically between 512 and 1024. These hash functions can be useful in combination with RSA [77] as digital signature scheme. However, this choice poses the following practical problem: the person who has generated the modulus knows its factorization, and hence he has a potential advantage over the other users of the hash function. One can try to design the hash function such that knowledge of the factorization does not help in attacking it (this is probably difficult to achieve). Alternatives are to use a trusted third party to generate the modulus (for example, the modulus of the Certification Authority), or to generate the modulus using a multi-party secure computation; recently practical solutions for such a computation have been developed by Boneh and Franklin [12] and Frankel et al. [40] .
The most efficient schemes are based on modular squaring. An additional argument for squaring is that any algorithm that can extract modular square roots is reducible to a factoring algorithm (in random polynomial time). The best scheme seems to be of the following form:
It is essential to add redundancy to the message input. The first designs for this redundancy were not very successful (see for example Girault [45] , Girault and Misarsky [47] , and Coppersmith [20] ). ISO/IEC SC27 has developed a new proposal, that is currently at the Final Draft International Standard (FDIS) level; it is called MASH-1 (for Modular Arithmetic Secure Hash) [51] :
here A = 0xF00...00, the four most significant bits in every byte of x i are set to 1111, and the output of the squaring operation is chopped to n bits. A complex output transformation is added, which consists of a number of applications of the compression function; its goal is to destroy all the remaining mathematical structure. The final result is at most n/2 bits. The best known preimage and collision attacks on MASH-1 require 2 n/2 and 2 n/4 operations [21] ; they are thus not better than brute force attacks. MASH-2 is a variant of MASH-1 which uses exponent 2 8 + 1 [51] . This provides for an additional security margin.
Schemes With a Security Reduction. For several schemes there exists a security reduction to a number theoretic problem that is believe to be difficult. However, they are very slow: typically they hash log 2 log 2 N bits per modular squaring (or even per modular exponentiation). Damgård provides two hash functions for which finding a collision is provably equivalent to factoring an RSA modulus [24] . Gibson proposes a construction based on the discrete logarithm problem modulo a composite [43] . A third approach uses the discrete logarithm problem in a group of prime order p denoted with G p (Bellare et al. [6] , after earlier work by Chaum et al. [18] and Brands). Every non-trivial element of G p is a generator. The hash function uses t random elements α i from G p (α i = 1). The hash result is then computed as MDCs Based on Knapsack and Lattice Problems. The knapsack problem (which is a special case of the subset sum problem) of dimensions n and (n) can be defined as follows: given a set of n l-bit integers {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n }, and an integer S, find a vector x with components x i equal to 0 or 1 such that
For application to hashing, one needs n > (n). The knapsack problem is known to be NP-hard; while this means that probably no feasible worst-case algorithms for this problem exists, this does not tell much about the hardness of a random instance. This problem was used in 1978 by Merkle and Hellman to construct the first public-key encryption system [62] . However, almost all public-key schemes based on the knapsack problem have been broken (see for example [65] ), which has given the knapsack a bad reputation. The appeal of the knapsack problem (and related lattice based problems) lies in the fact that both hardware and software implementations are very fast compared to schemes based on number theoretic problems. Moreover, evaluation of a knapsack allows for significant parallelism. Finally, interesting security reductions can be proved: examples are the work for Impagliazzo and Naor [50] on knapsacks and that of Ajtai [3] for lattices; Ajtai was able to prove that if the shortest vector in a lattice problem is hard in the worst case, then the knapsack problem is hard on the average. However, some researchers believe that for realistic parameters, both these problems are relatively easy. If they are right, knapsack and lattice problems are not useful to practical cryptography. Attacks on knapsacks often use the LLL lattice reduction algorithm [56] that finds the shortest vector in a lattice (the algorithm performs in practice much better than can be guaranteed). This reduction to the shortest vector problem only works for (n) > 1.0629 · n. Knapsack problems become more difficult when n ≈ (n); however, the performance of the hash function decreases with the value n − (n). For n = (n), the best known attack requires time O(2 n/2 ) and space O(2 n/4 ). Impagliazzo and Naor summarize the state of the art in [50] . A different class of attacks are the algebraic attacks proposed by Camion and Patarin [14] and optimized by Patarin in [66] ; these attacks tend to work better when n (n). The scheme of Damgård [26] has been broken both using LLL [52] and using algebraic techniques [66] . It is for the time being an open problem whether a random knapsack with n = 1024, l = 512, and = 512 is hard to solve.
Impagliazzo and Naor describe an efficient construction for a UOWHF (cf. Sect. 2.3) and provide a reduction of its security to that of the knapsack problem [50] . Ajtai introduced a function that is one-way (or preimage resistant) if the [48] . Several multiplicative knapsacks have also been proposed; multiplicative notation is used for non-Abelian groups. The earliest proposal dates back to '77 (but it was quickly shown to be insecure). A recent example are the schemes by Zémor [88] and Tillich and Zémor [84] . Their security is based on the hardness of finding short factorizations in certain groups. In some cases one can even prove a lower bound on the Hamming distance between colliding messages. Attacks on these proposals (for certain parameters) can be found in [17, 41] . Impagliazzo and Naor also extend their construction on a UOWHF to multiplication in a group [50] .
Knapsack and lattice based hash functions have also the potential problem that trapdoors may be inserted when the vectors are generated. Therefore it is recommended that the instance generation is reproducible (for example, through the use of a pseudo-random string generator or a hash function).
Incremental Hash Functions. A hash function (or any cryptographic primitive) is called incremental if it has the following property: if the hash function has been evaluated for an input x, and a small modification is made to x, resulting in x , then one can update h(x) in time proportional to the amount of modification between x and x , rather than having to recompute h(x ) from scratch. If a function is incremental, it is automatically parallelizable as well.
This concept was first introduced by Bellare et al. [6] . They also made a first proposal based on exponentiation in a group of prime order. Improved constructions were proposed by Bellare and Micciancio [8] that consist of two steps:
-First the message is divided into blocks; each block (together with its index) is hashed using a conventional collision resistant hash function (restricted to fixed length inputs). This is called the 'randomization' step as in the analysis the hash function is treated as an 'ideal' hash function or random oracle (which is a very demanding requirement). -Next the different outputs are combined using a group operation. This can be a group of large prime order in which the discrete logarithm problem is hard, and modular addition. The first approach leads to a reduction to the discrete logarithm problem, while the second leads to a reduction to the 'weighted knapsack' problem.
The same techniques can also be used to improve the lattice based hash function. These schemes have the advantage that they are much more efficient than the other schemes studied in this section. However, this comes at a cost of requiring a collision resistant hash function, which also has to behave 'perfectly random.' This construction is remarkable, as it construct a collision resistant function based on a one-way property (but with specific algebraic structure, so there is no contradiction to the result of Simon [82] discussed in Sect. 3.3).
Custom Designed MDCs
This section discusses a selection of custom designed hash functions, i.e., algorithms that were especially designed for hashing operations. Most of these algorithms use the Davies-Meyer approach (cf. Sect. 4.1): the compression function is a block cipher, 'keyed' by the text input x i ; the plaintext is the value H i−1 , which is also added to the ciphertext (feedforward). In 1990, R. Rivest proposed MD4 [75] , a hash function with a 128-bit result based on 32-bit integer arithmetic. While this hash function proved to be not sufficiently strong, the innovative design ideas have influenced many other designs. The algorithms derived from it (with improved strength) are often called the MDx-family. This family contains the most popular hash functions in use today. Dobbertin has found collisions for MD4; his attack combines algebraic techniques and optimization techniques such as genetic algorithms [32, 33] . It can be extended in such a way that even 'meaningful' collisions are obtained: the complete message (except for a few dozen bytes) is under complete control of the attacker. His attack also applies to the compression function of 'extended MD4' [75] , which consists of concatenating two loosely coupled instances of MD4. Later Dobbertin showed that a reduced version of MD4 (2 rounds out of 3) is not preimage resistant [35] .
Following early attacks on MD4 by Merkle and den Boer and Bosselaers [29] , Rivest quickly designed a strengthened version, namely MD5 [76] . It was however shown by den Boer and Bosselaers [30] that the compression function of MD5 is not collision resistant (but their collisions are of the form f (H i−1 , x i ) = f (H i−1 , x i ), which is not immediately usable in practice). Dobbertin has extended his attack on MD4 to yield collisions for the compression function of MD5, i.e., f (H i−1 , x i ) = f (H i−1 , x i ), where he has some control over H i−1 [34] . It is believed that it is feasible to extend this attack to collisions for MD5 itself (that is, to take into account the IV ).
A second improved variant of MD4, the Secure Hash Algorithm, was proposed by NIST [38] in 1993. The size of the hash result is increased from 128 to 160 bits and the message words are not simply permuted but encoded with a shortened cyclic code. After a few years, NSA discovered a certificational weakness in SHA; apparently collisions can be found in less than 2 80 operations. Consequently a new release of the standard was published. The new algorithm is called SHA-1 [39] . Recently Chabaud and Joux have published an attack that finds collisions for SHA in 2 61 operations [16] ; it is probably similar to the (classified) attack developed earlier that prompted the upgrade to SHA-1.
Yet another improved version of MD4, called RIPEMD, was developed in the framework of the EEC-RACE project RIPE [74] . Due to partial attacks by Dobbertin [32] , it was later upgraded by Dobbertin et al. to RIPEMD-128 and RIPEMD-160, that have a 128-bit and a 160-bit result respectively [36] . Variants with a 256 and 320-bit result have been introduced as well. Together with SHA-1, RIPEMD-128 and RIPEMD-160 are the three custom designed hash functions included in ISO/IEC 10118-3 [51] .
Merkle suggested in 1989 a software oriented one-way hash function called Snefru [61] . It is based on large random substitution tables (2 Kbyte per pass) and allows for a variable size of the result (128 or 256 bits). Biham and Shamir have shown that Snefru-128 [11] is vulnerable to differential attacks. As a consequence it is recommended to use 6 and preferably 8 passes, preferably with a 256-bit hash result. However, these measures increase the size of the substitution tables and decrease the performance.
Two of the most recent designs are Tiger and Panama. Tiger was proposed by Anderson and Biham [4] . It is tuned towards 64-bit processors and mixes Snefru-type S-boxes (8 input bits and 64 output bits) with arithmetic operations. Panama is a design of Daemen and Clapp [23] ; it has been designed to take advantage of the instruction-level parallelism in modern processors.
Conclusions and Open Problems
In spite of the popularity of cryptographic hash functions, very few theoretical results are known in this area; it is clear that further research is necessary to improve our understanding of these primitives. Collision resistance seems to be a condition that is particularly hard to analyze. Some open problems are whether it is possible to construct collision resistant hash functions based on weaker assumptions, and whether any theory can be developed to support the current constructions.
In the area of practical constructions, there is a need for more efficient hash functions, the security of which is better understood. For hash functions based on block ciphers, the main problem seems to be the assumptions on the block cipher. From an application viewpoint, multiplicative knapsacks seem to be very attractive (due to inherent parallelism and due to the fact that certain properties can be proved). However, further research is necessary to assess their security. Another research problem is to understand to which extent the current constructions provide other security properties such as pseudo-randomness and partial preimage resistance; both properties are related to the difficulty of inverting the hash function if part of the input is known.
